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Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to investigate to what extent an 
increased dependency on auto captives has affected the likelihood of 
bankruptcy for automotive manufacturing groups (AMGs). If so, we wish to 
critically examine whether this can be attributed to inadequate risk 
management practices. This will be done by studying the major AMGs 
during the years 2002-2008 both in a quantitative and qualitative manner. 
 
Methodology: A quantitative approach using regression analysis has been 
used. Aspects not covered by the quantitative study are qualitatively 
examined. 
 
Theoretical 
perspectives: The theoretical perspective is derived from classical risk 
management theory. Altman z-score and credit rating agencies’ methodology 
is used.  
 
Empirical 
foundation: The automotive manufacturer industry during 2002-2008 has 
empirically been studied to obtain the data needed. 
 
Conclusions: This study quantitatively shows that an increased dependency 
on auto captives does increase the likelihood of bankruptcy for AMGs. Our 
study of qualitative aspects did also find several factors pointing out 
deficiencies risk management practices as an underlying cause.  
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Abstract 
This thesis set out with the aim of answering the question to what extent an 
increased dependency on auto financing has affected the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. A regression analysis is used to statistically measure if risk is 
transferred from captives to automotive manufacturing groups during the 
years 2002 and 2008. Measurements of credit risk in both a quantitative and 
qualitative manner are evaluated. Altman’s z-score is used as a quantitative 
measure of credit risk. A theoretical framework describing risk management 
and credit rating agencies approach to captives is discussed. The study 
suggests that observed changes in credit risk among automotive 
manufacturers can to a large extent be attributed to their captive activities. 
Based on this conclusion, the problems of consumer related auto financing in 
the automotive industry is discussed in the context of the current (spring 
2009) financial crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
The first chapter of this thesis starts by introducing the importance of and the 
difficulties in the automotive industry. We then discuss the problems 
surrounding the auto financing industry, which leads us down to the purpose 
of this thesis. The chapter ends with delimitations of the purpose and an 
outline of the thesis. 
1.1.  Background  
The global automotive industry has been severely impacted during the initial 
stages of the financial crisis. Car sales dried up the last quarter of 2008 when 
global demand dropped. The crisis is characterised as being systematic in 
nature leaving no one untouched. Leading brands such as BMW, Ford, 
Mercedes, Honda and Toyota have seen sales plummet by more than 20% 
during the last year (The Economist, 2009). 
 
The cause is no mystery. First, the spike in oil prices caused a shift in 
demand from gasoline consuming trucks to smaller more environmentally 
friendly cars resulting in plummeting residual values
1
. Second, contracting 
credit markets made it more difficult for customers to obtain loans to buy 
new cars (IHS Global Insight, 2009). To make matters worse automotive 
manufacturing groups (AMGs) are struggling with insupportable operational 
gearing from having made heavy investments in modernising factories and 
expanding production capacity. The automotive consultancy CSM estimated 
the global production capacity to be close to 94 million vehicles annually, 
while forecasted level of demand for 2009 is about 60 million (CSM 
Worldwide, 2009).  
 
                                                 
1
 Residual value risk is defined by Fitch (2006) as the risk that the residual value at the end 
of the financing agreement falls short of the initially assumed residual value. 
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Currently, auto manufacturers are desperately trying to scale back operations 
and adapt to new market conditions. However, because of the capital 
intensive and inflexible nature of vehicle production, progress is slow and 
cash burn severe. As a result, actors are forced to join the ferocious incentive 
battle in an effort to reduce the mounting stock of unsold cars weighing 
heavy on their financials (Schäfer, 2009). A fact accentuated by industry 
catch phrases such as “put steel on the road” or “move the metal” (Hener, 
2005, p. 1).  
 
Vehicle sales incentives have almost doubled over the last 6 years (see  
Exhibit A in appendix) and roughly 90 percent of new vehicles in the US and 
60 percent in Europe are purchased with some type of financing (The 
Economist, 2009). Consequently, auto captives whose main purpose is to 
facilitate vehicle sales will play a key role as time progresses (Hener, 2005). 
 
The major CRAs, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch classify a captive as 
a finance unit with the majority of its receivables originating from sales of 
the parent company’s goods or services and a strategic mission closely linked 
to the parent’s objectives (Standard & Poor's, 2007) (Moody's, 2007) (Fitch, 
2006). A captive finance subsidiary can be considered as an extension of a 
firm’s marketing activities. It can be structured either as a legally separate 
entity or as a division of the company (Standard & Poor's, 2008). The entity’s 
primary function is to facilitate sales of goods or services from its parent 
company by providing lease or debt financing to customers or/and dealers. It 
is also not uncommon for it to finance the inventory and receivables of its 
parent as well as selling insurance (Fitch, 2006).  
1.2. Problem discussion 
Early empirical research on the use of captives was made by Banner (1958). 
He evaluated potential risks as well as benefits arising from having a finance 
captive by examining non-financial US firms utilising captives for sales 
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financing. He concluded that consumer credit can be a more potent 
competitive instrument than an attractive product price and argued that 
captives have played a vital role in supporting high growth rates in several 
major industries, with the automotive industry used as an example. However, 
he also argued that the lack of independence of a captive may affect its credit 
policy by suggesting that the competitive advantages associated with offering 
consumer credit may cause the parent company to pressure its captive to 
continue with potentially unprofitable or risky lending (Banner, 1958).  
 
Empirical research studying the potential benefits of having captives was 
made by Gradient (1966), Didriksen (1966) and Lavinat & Sondhi (1986). 
They found that captives can improve earnings management by separating 
the sales function from the receivables management function more effectively 
than its parent. Didriksen (1966) also concluded that large companies with 
substantial amounts of receivables and/or lease contracts extract the most 
benefits. 
 
However, more recent studies have almost exclusively focused on captive 
credit policies and the risks involved. Boczar (1978), Remolona & 
Wulfekuhler (1992) and Carey et al. (1998) examined how lending practices 
differ between banks and finance companies. They did so by looking at risk 
segmentation of consumer loan markets and the presence of asymmetric 
information and concluded that finance companies generally service 
borrowers of higher risk levels than banks. Carey et al. (1998) also 
investigated the underlying causes as to why captives pursue more risky 
lending. They found evidence supporting Banner’s (1958) argument, 
suggesting that the parent’s commercial interests may outweigh restrictive 
credit policies. In addition, they found that the portfolio structures of banks 
differed substantially in that they hold significantly less lease and auto related 
financing, which is consistent with a lower risk profile since lessees are 
considered more risky than those that purchase assets outright. Sharpe & 
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Nguyen (1995) suggested that lenders pursuing more lease related activities 
are either more capable at managing the additional risk or are more willing to 
bear it compared to other lenders.  
 
Garner et al. (1994) offered another explanation for differences in lending 
practices between banks and captives. They suggested that differences can be 
attributed to the use of different control and monitoring strategies. Banks are 
often characterised as “cash flow” lenders and captives as “asset-based” 
lenders. The typical cash flow oriented bank does not focus on the asset 
itself, but does a strict evaluation of historical and future projected cash flows 
of a borrower before granting a loan. In contrast, asset-based lenders focus 
less on cash flows and place a greater reliance on the collateral value of the 
asset after the loan is granted. 
 
Studies specifically focusing on risks in auto finance industry were made by 
Hener (2005), Diekmann (2006) and Barron et al. (2008). Their results were 
consistent with earlier empirical research, concluding that captives employ 
more lenient credit policies than banks, which in turn reduces the likelihood 
of loan repayments. As an explanation they suggested that the sale proceeds 
from the vehicle subsidise any potential loss suffered on the lending side. 
Diekmann (2006) follows Banner’s (1958) argument by suggesting that 
competitive pressure from the vehicle market is likely to spread to the auto 
finance market, which in turn can encourage more risky behaviour in 
captives. Consequently, management will face an increasingly difficult task, 
which is to balance the need for supporting sales with incentivised customer 
financing and manage risk (Hener, 2005). 
 
However, no study has to our knowledge been conducted, investigating how 
successful AMGs have been at managing the increased risk specifically 
caused by pursuing aggressive lending/leasing practices. The relevance of 
such a study is further enhanced by a study made by Fitch (2008), a leading 
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credit rating agency, which found a negative correlation between sales 
incentives and wholesale prices on vehicles. By reducing the purchase price, 
an artificial demand for new vehicles is created. They get more affordable, 
which in turn affects demand for used vehicles. As a consequence of using 
incentives, the residual value risk exposure of the captive will increase due to 
lower secondary market values of used vehicles (Fitch, 2006). If the captive 
also engages in leasing, its risk exposure will increase further due to rising 
turn-in rates
2
 (Standard & Poor's, 2008). The risk will be even greater if 
technical achievements, e.g. in more environmentally friendly vehicles, 
become increasingly successful, causing the secondary market to get even 
more unstable. 
 
As discussed, there are considerable risks involved with becoming too reliant 
on captives to support sales activities. With the industry in a dire condition 
and auto financing accounting for a growing share of the manufacturing 
groups’ overall revenues, managing the risks involved becomes crucial. We 
therefore intend to investigate how the development of auto financing has 
affected the credit risk in AMGs.  
1.3. Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate to what extent an increased 
dependency on auto captives has affected the likelihood of bankruptcy for 
AMGs. If so, we wish to critically examine whether this can be attributed to 
inadequate risk management practices. This will be done by studying the 
major AMGs during the years 2002-2008 both in a quantitative and 
qualitative manner. 
                                                 
2
 Turn-in rate is defined by Fitch Ratings (2008) as the number of vehicles returned to the 
lessor at lease termination as a percentage of the number of lease contracts that were 
scheduled to mature during the same period. 
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1.4. Delimitations 
There are several additional factors, not included in this study, affecting the 
risk in captives e.g. access to capital markets, committed parental support, 
residual value setting policies and separation between operational and 
financial vehicle leases. However, in order for us to perform a quantitative 
investigation about the effects from these factors, we would require access to 
internal data. This has however not been feasible due to restrictive and 
varying disclosure standards from the auto captives. We will therefore not 
quantitatively study the specific methods used by auto manufacturers to 
manage its credit risks, in particular regarding the use of securitisation and 
derivatives. We also do not study Chinese and Indian actors, due to their 
limited disclosure of data relating to captives. 
1.5. Outline 
Chapter 2 gives an introduction of the automotive industry. A brief 
description of the global market is followed by a more detailed presentation 
of auto finance activities and the use of captives. In Chapter 3 the theoretical 
framework is presented with the focus on risk management and models used 
to evaluate credit risk. Data collection and methodological approach is 
described in Chapter 4, including choice of dependent and independent 
variables. Methodological problems are also clarified. In Chapter 5 empirical 
findings from the collected raw data are presented. Results from the 
regression are analysed based on our theoretical framework. Chapter 6 serves 
two purposes. First, we conclude our study based on the regression analysis. 
Secondly, a discussion will be held regarding qualitative aspects not 
explicitly covered by the analysis. The chapter ends with suggestions for 
future research. 
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2. Automotive industry  
It is essential to understand the underlying structures and main 
characteristics of the auto finance industry. In this chapter we describe the 
global automotive industry and the risks and services behind auto financing. 
2.1. Role and relevance 
The global importance of the automotive industry can be attributed to its key 
role in modern society, both as an economic and transportation factor. 
According to a trade and development study made by the United Nations 
examining the world’s largest economic entities, 7 out of 29 multinational 
companies studied were AMGs (Hener, 2005). The automotive supply chain 
represents a significant share of all global manufacturing jobs and is a major 
contributor to international trade (IHS Global Insight, 2009). The global 
automotive industry is divided into three major geographical markets. Their 
respective share of total value in 2008 is; Asia-pacific (35,9 percent), 
Americas (30,8 percent) and Europe (26,7 percent). 
 
The industry generated total revenues of €1058bn in 2008 and have grown by 
a CAGR
3
 of 3,5 percent since 2004 (Datamonitor, 2008). The importance is 
further accentuated by including distribution and financing related activities 
as well as governmental income from vehicle taxes. Vehicle tax revenues in 
the EU for 2008 alone were in excess of €360bn (IHS Global Insight, 2009). 
 
The industry has undergone considerable change during the last decades. 
Three major trends have been identified. First, a global pursuit of economies 
of scale created a wave of consolidation among AMGs, as shown by the 
steady decline of independent actors from 62 in 1960 down to 12 in 2004 
(Becker, 2006). Forecasts predict that the number is likely to fall below 10 by 
2015 (Diekmann, 2006). Already, the four largest actors account for almost 
                                                 
3
 CAGR = Compounded annual growth rate 
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half of the global market. The pursuit of economies of scale was also the 
reason behind the substantial build up of production capacity that occurred 
during the period. Second, product differentiation and shortening product life 
cycles, which according to Becker (2006) were caused by a rising consumer 
demand for distinct products spurred on by rapid advances in production 
technologies. Third, a focus on operational improvements, achieving a lean 
production, utilising Just-In-Time methods and outsourcing peripheral 
activities (Diekmann, 2006). The actual effect from these changes is a vehicle 
production process with high fixed costs and strained profit margins. The 
bank UBS estimated the average industry profit margin to be well below 3 
percent over the last five years, which in turn have left AMGs badly equipped 
to respond to fluctuations in consumer demand (IHS Global Insight, 2009). 
 
In addition, practically all manufacturers are facing significant capital 
expenditures over the coming years to develop new technologies needed to 
comply with future low emission requirements (Diekmann, 2006). A survey 
conducted by KPMG in 2006 unveiled that the top concerns among the key 
manufacturers were product quality, reducing cost and new technology. 
When the same survey was conducted 2 years later it restated previous results 
15%
11%
10%
9%
55%
Global market share: by 
company
Toyota Motor 
15.4%
General Motors 
10.8%
Daimler AG 
9.8%
Ford Motor 
9.4%
Source: Datamonitor (2008) 
Figure 1 Major actors by share of total value. 
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but showed a dramatic increase in awareness concerning environmental 
issues, new products and product/pricing incentives (KPMG, 2009).  
2.1.1. Auto finance and the use of captives 
Studies show that the majority of profits generated during the lifetime of a 
vehicle originate from downstream activities (Volkswagen financial Services, 
2004).  
As can be seen in table 1, vehicle insurance, leasing and financing generates 
close to a quarter of all profits, making it highly attractive to AMGs, which in 
turn can explain the strong global growth in the use of captives (Diekmann, 
2006). As a result, they are now considered key elements in vehicle sales 
strategies (IHS Global Insight, 2009). It should also be noted that auto 
captives are far from being the only suppliers of auto financing. Commercial 
banks and other finance institutions accounted for roughly two thirds of the 
total global auto finance market volume in 2008 (Diekmann, 2006).  
 
Auto captives enjoy a number of advantages over its competitors. The close 
relationship with its parent generally gives them a better exposure at sales 
locations and lower distribution costs shielding them from competitive 
pressures from outside finance companies (Standard & Poor's, 2007). 
Up-stream activities 38%
Manufacturer 16%
Modules suppliers 7%
Component specialists 8%
Standard parts suppliers 2%
Raw material providers 5%
Down-stream activities 62%
New car retailing 5%
Leasing & financing 9%
Insurance business 15%
Used car retailing 12%
Car rental business 4%
Service & parts business 17%
Source: Volkswagen financial Services (2004) 
 
Table 1 Profit contributions in the automotive 
value chain. 
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However, their strategic focus may hinder diversification efforts as captives 
tend to have a greater degree of geographic and customer concentration than 
non-parent affiliated competitors (Standard & Poor's, 2008). 
 
2.1.2.  Auto finance incentives and products 
Auto finance products can be divided into two main categories leasing and 
financing. Several variations exist. These include zero or low-rate financing, 
lease subvention programs, cash bonuses, insurance, extended loan terms, 
target marketing and pre-approved credit marketing. Their popularity has 
varied over time and between markets. Distinctions are not always clear cut, 
especially when considered on a global scale (International, 2005). 
Financing 
The terms and specifications of auto finance contracts vary. A typical 
contract is structured as a loan based on fixed monthly payments. However, 
contracts can be structured in a variety of ways and are often customised to 
meet consumer preferences, e.g. extended loan terms. Auto loans or financing 
is traditionally regarded as a relatively low risk activity mainly due to the 
collateralisation provided by the vehicle (Diekmann, 2006). 
Leasing 
A common definition of leasing is a contract granting utilisation of an object 
during a specified time period without ownership being transferred (Hener, 
2005). The popularity of auto leasing comes from its positive effects on 
liquidity as well as enabling off-balance sheet financing. Despite being 
highly flexible in terms of duration and payment, literature describes two 
dominating lease structures. In one of the structures the customer returns the 
vehicle to the lessor at the end of the period, while other structure gives the 
customer an option to purchase the vehicle at residual value (Diekmann, 
2006). The average duration of a lease contract ranges from 36 to 48 months 
(Fitch, 2006). 
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2.1.3. Captive specific risks explained in detail 
The reason as to why the AMGs captives have been hit so exceptionally hard 
by the financial crisis can be explained by their portfolio structures (The 
Economist, 2009). As mentioned, captives are generally less diversified than 
other competing suppliers of auto finance (Standard & Poor's, 2008). Banks 
places less emphasis on collateral values by assuming that they move in sync 
with the overall state of the economy. This assumption holds given that their 
portfolio is well diversified causing fluctuations in collateral values to offset 
one another. Captives on the other hand are left exposed to shifts in the 
vehicle market, which does not necessarily need to move with the overall 
economy (Diekmann, 2006).  
 
Fitch (2008) present key factors affecting default and recovery risk in auto 
loans. Captives have begun offering loans with extended-terms, which is in 
line with the growing trend of providing incentivised financing to consumers. 
The average maturity of new auto loans have increased from 52,7 to 63 
months since 1999, which according to Fitch (2008) increases the likelihood 
of obligor credit migration
4
 as the lender remains exposed to a borrower for a 
longer time period. Loan delinquencies are therefore expected to increase 
significantly, since historical levels show a deteriorating performance for 
loans with maturities over 60 months. A possible explanation may be that 
extended term loans enable consumers to buy a car in a price range above 
what would be possible under terms offered in the past. Another trend in auto 
finance is the increase in Loan-To-Value ratios
5
 (LTV), which has jumped 
from 88 percent in 2005 to 93 percent in 2008. Consumers are now offered 
loans close to full value with down payments sometimes being waived 
altogether or incorporated into the monthly payments. As LTV increase so 
does the likelihood of default. (Fitch, 2008) 
 
                                                 
4
 Credit migration is defined as a deterioration in the credit quality of an obligor 
5
 Loan-To-Value ratio is the relationship between the amount of the mortgage loan and the 
appraised value of the property expressed as a percentage 
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Assessing the riskiness of auto lease transactions is according to Diekmann 
(2006) even more complex, primarily due to its higher exposure to residual 
value risk. Residual value risk is defined as: “The risk that the residual value 
at the end of the financing agreement falls short of the initially assumed 
residual value” (Fitch, 2006, p.1). In contrast to auto loan transactions where 
the lender is exposed to residual value risk only in case of default, the lessor 
in a lease transaction is left exposed each time a lessee choose not to 
purchase the vehicle at the end of the contract period (Standard & Poor's, 
2008). However, a study made by Schmit (2003) showed that leasing in the 
automotive industry is a relatively low risk activity. The study included the 
years from 1990 to 2000 and examined leasing of vehicles by financial 
institutions in Europe. 
 
There are several factors affecting the residual value risk according to Fitch 
(2006). First, the residual value setting policy of the originator plays a critical 
role since it is the foundation on which interest and amortisation payments 
are based. Establishing the future market resale value of a vehicle is 
considered as fairly unpredictable and can be tailored to suit the overall 
business objectives (Diekmann, 2006). In effect, the captive can promote 
leasing by setting a higher residual value, thus lowering the required monthly 
payments, making the arrangement more attractive to consumers. Risk in 
lease transactions is also driven by typical supply and demand factors 
affecting price volatility in the used vehicle market as well as the turn-in 
rates. Such factors include the overall state of the economy as a proxy for 
consumer spending capacity, size and stability of the market as well as the 
likelihood of manufacturers leaving the market (Fitch, 2006). 
 
Fahey (2003) identified another potential source of risk in the incentive 
structure used by AMGs. To shield their captives from competition 
manufacturers integrate incentives into lease or financing rates rather than 
giving direct cash discounts. The incentive can then either be treated as a 
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marketing cost or the parent can make an estimation of future resale value 
and make a reservation for a future loss. This may give rise to the risk of 
overstating sales, forcing the captive to realise significant losses in the event 
of a market downturn.  
 
The risks associated with sales incentives and leasing was made evident in 
the beginning of 2001 when AMGs with their captives lost an estimated 
$10,5bn after having significantly overestimated vehicle residual values. It 
began in 1996 to 1997 with declining demand for SUV
6
s. AMGs started 
offering cheap financing rates to counter this effect, causing lease volumes to 
rise sharply over the coming years. Attractive deals on new vehicles caused 
turn-in rates to rise, as consumers returned vehicles to the AMGs rather than 
using the option to purchase at lease termination (Fahey, 2003). The 
secondary market became oversupplied causing prices on used vehicles to 
fall, leaving the AMGs highly exposed to residual losses. The AMGs did 
however first not respond to indications of falling residual values. 
Consequently, the majority of lease contracts, initiated between 1997 and 
2000, were based on inflated residual values (Adesa analytical services, 
2008). The AMGs only started to pull back on leasing activities once lease 
contracts expired and residual value losses became a fact.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 SUV=Sport utility vehicle 
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Considering that the average lease contract ranges between 3 to 4 years, this 
failure to act were to affect their financial performance for years. Diekmann 
(2006) uses this episode as an example, showing deficiencies in the risk 
management practices of AMGs.  
  
Source: Adesa analytical services (2008) 
 
Figure 2 Change (%) in lease volume from prior year. 
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3.  Theoretical and institutional framework 
The third chapter describes the theoretical framework concerning risk and 
risk management. Quantitative measures of credit risk are presented, 
followed by a description of credit rating agencies’ approach to evaluating 
qualitative aspects of risk in captives. 
3.1. The nature of risk 
Froot (2003) describes risk as variability in cash flows, which is a disturbing 
factor to both investment and financing activities. Risk is defined by Culp 
(2002) as; “any source of randomness that may have an adverse impact on 
the market value of a corporation’s assets net of liabilities, on its earnings, 
and/or on its raw cash flows” (Culp C. L., 2001, p.14).  
3.2. Risk management 
Management of corporate risk has been described through hedging models 
developed by Johnson (1960) and Stein (1961) and later Ederington (1979). 
They have all treated risk from the perspective of a single investor who is 
risk-averse. Corporate hedging has consequently been regarded as the same 
as an individual “trader hedging”, which is unsatisfactory according to Culp 
(2001), who builds his argument from the theory by Jensen & Meckling 
(1976), where a company is described not as a single investor, but as a 
“nexus of contracts”. Hence, a company does not have a single mind of its 
own but is an entity of individuals with different objectives. According to the 
findings of Modigliani & Miller (1958) and (1961), the capital structure has 
no relevant influence on a company who operates in a market without 
contracting costs or taxes. They stated that arbitrage profits cannot be made 
through managing risk by e.g. hedging. However, Culp (2001) argues that 
these criterions seldom reflects the reality and implies that risk management 
can be conducted to achieve value adding effects. 
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3.3. Core and non-core risk 
Knight (1921) recognises that profits stem out from risk or uncertainty. He 
specifies risk as a situation of randomness that has an impact on a firm but is 
quantifiable. Since the risk is quantifiable it can also be managed. 
Uncertainty is described as randomness that is unquantifiable e.g. specific 
skills inherent to a specific company. Knight (1921) argues that with 
uncertainty eliminated, profits or losses would not exist. A company must 
carry this uncertainty but manage the risks. Studies made by Stultz (1996) 
confirmed that certain risks can add more value to specific firms if the 
management has a comparative advantage in estimating future prices. Such 
risks should therefore not be hedged. Schrand and Unal (1998) also 
acknowledge that firms’ profit from bearing risk that is uniquely related to 
the business conducted. They refer to this type of risk as core-risk which 
supports Stultz (1996) argument that this type of risk should not be managed. 
All other risk should be hedged such as interest rate or currency risk. Culp 
(2002) concludes earlier arguments by suggesting that companies must 
recognise specific risks typical for their industry and keep this core risk 
within the company, while hedging the remaining non-core risk. He also 
discusses risk in terms of idiosyncratic and systematic risk. Idiosyncratic risk 
represents risk inherent to only a small number of assets and can be almost 
completely eliminated by diversification. Systematic risk, by comparison 
affects all existing cash flows on the market and cannot be diversified (Culp 
C. L., 2001). 
 
3.4. Credit risk 
Credit risk is defined as the probability that an actor on the market cannot 
meet its obligations towards its obligor (Basel Commitee on Banking 
Supervision, 1997). Culp (2001) further defines credit risk by its source into 
direct and indirect risk. Direct credit risk, also known as default risk and 
downgrade risk. Default risk describes failure by another party to deliver 
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funds on time, whereas downgrade risk is the increased probability that this 
will occur. Indirect credit risk represents the effect that changes in credit 
worthiness of an unrelated third party can have on the present value of a 
bundle of cash flows (Ibid).  
3.4.1. Credit risk management 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
7
 (1997) identified a set of key 
aspects to consider when analysing banks’ (BIS, 2000) and financial 
institutions’ (Hener, 2005) credit risk management practices. This was further 
elaborated in the report “Principles for the management of credit risk” 
published by the committee in 2000. The principles can be divided into five 
groups covering the different aspects of the credit risk management process 
including the;  
 
(i) Credit risk environment  
(ii) Credit granting process 
(iii)Credit measurement and monitoring process 
(iv) Controls over credit risk 
(v) The role of supervisors. (BIS, 2000)  
 
The report also identified the most common indicators of poor credit risk 
management practices, highlighting concentration of credit exposures to a 
certain geographical market, sector or industry as being the most important. 
Moreover, problems arising from weaknesses in the credit granting process 
are common e.g. subjective decision-making by senior management, poor 
adherence to changes in collateral values as well as inability to evaluate 
business cycle effects on lending from relying on overly optimistic 
projections. Also, lacking a sound risk-sensitive pricing methodology tend to 
attract a disproportionately large share of under priced risks (Ibid).  
                                                 
7
 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision consists of central banks and supervisory 
authorities from members; Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States 
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3.5. Default risk from a Merton perspective 
Another framework used to determine the risk of default is the Merton 
model, first published under the title “On the pricing of Corporate Debt: The 
Risk Structure of Interest Rates” in the Journal of Finance in 1974. It 
acknowledges three main determinants for the value of debt: 
 
(i) Required return on risk free debt (risk free in terms of default e.g. 
government bonds) 
(ii) Provisions and restrictions contained in the indenture 
(iii)The probability of default 
 
These assumptions are then evaluated using the general equilibrium theory of 
option pricing developed by Black & Scholes (1973) which makes the 
following assumptions: 
 
(i) The market is perfect 
(ii) The Modigliani-Miller theorem holds, the value of the firm is 
invariant to which capital structure it obtains (1958) 
(iii)The market follows the “efficient market hypothesis” described by 
Fama (1970) 
 
The probability of default is then calculated by viewing a firm’s equity and 
debt as contingent claims (European call option) issued against the firm’s 
underlying assets (Merton, 1974). Input variables needed to calculate 
distance to default through the Merton model are the following: 
 
 Market value of the firm’s equity 
 Market value of the firm’s assets 
 Total amount of the firm’s debt (book value) 
 Time to maturity of the firm’s debt 
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 Risk free interest rate 
 Equity volatility 
 
All variables are observable except for market value of the firm’s assets and 
volatility of the firm’s assets. These have to be calculated under assumptions 
made by Black & Scholes (1973). 
 
The strength with the Merton model is the solid foundation of theories 
mentioned on which it is modelled. However, Byström & Kwon (2007) 
mentions some weaknesses in the model: it is e.g. based on accounting data 
and historical stock volatilities. This requires accurate and up to date balance 
sheet data and also makes the model sensitive to changes in the stock market 
(Byström & Kwon, 2007). Furthermore Culp (2001) argues that the capital 
structure of a firm is rarely as simple as the Merton model implies - based on 
equity plus zero coupon debt with a single maturity date using the volatility 
of equity as an approximation for asset volatility tends to be a source of error. 
 
3.6. Default risk from a Altman’s z-score perspective 
The Altman z-score originates from Edward Altman who published his 
model in Journal of Finance in 1968. The model offers a quite simple but 
efficient way to calculate probability of default, using a multivariate, taking 
certain key ratios into consideration. Altman divided his sample of 66 firms 
into two equally large groups. One group contained the firms that had gone 
bankrupt during the years 1945-1965 and the other group contained the firms 
that still were in good financial health in 1966. Altman tested 22 financial 
ratios derived from the firms in the sample with multiple discriminate 
analysis to find which composition of the ratios that did the best job in 
predicting bankruptcy. (Altman E. , 1968)  
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The five ratios Altman found to give the best model are listed below: 
𝑋1, Working capital/Total assets 
𝑋2, Retained earnings/Total assets 
𝑋3, EBIT/Total assets 
𝑋4, Market value equity/Book value of debt 
𝑋5, Sales / Total assets 
 
𝑿𝟏, Working capital/Total assets 
Working capital is defined as the difference between current assets and 
current liabilities (Copeland, Koller, & Murrin, 2000). This ratio is frequently 
found in studies of corporate problems and is a measure of net liquid assets of 
the firm relative to total capitalisation. A firm that suffers from decreasing 
operating profits will be reflected by shrinking current assets in comparison 
to total assets. (Altman E. , 1968) 
 
𝑿𝟐, Retained earnings/Total assets 
Retained earnings reflect the amount of reinvested earnings/losses of a firm. 
A hint of the leverage can also be given through this ratio since firms with a 
large amount of retained earnings relative to total assets imply that they have 
refinanced through retention of profits instead of debt. This measure can be 
subject to “manipulation” through stock reorganisations or stock dividends. 
Bias in this measure would also exist if the company has undertaken a 
substantial reorganisation. (Ibid) 
 
𝑿𝟑, EBIT/Total assets 
Independent of any tax or leverage factors does this ratio contribute to the 
overall score with a true indicator of productivity of the company’s assets. 
This is one of the key indicators, since insolvency is measured when assets 
value is exceeded by the value of total liabilities. (Ibid) 
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𝑿𝟒, Market value of equity/Book value of debt 
This ratio adds market value dimension which according to Altman (1968) 
many other studies fail to consider. The ratio measures how much the 
company can decrease in value before the firm becomes insolvent. (Ibid) 
 
𝑿𝟓, Sales / Total assets 
The sales generating ability of the firm’s asset, also known as the capital-
turnover ratio, gives a picture on how well the company survives competitive 
conditions. (Ibid) 
 
The model developed by Altman: 
z-score = 𝟏,𝟐 ∗ 𝑿𝟏 + 𝟏,𝟒 ∗ 𝑿𝟐 + 𝟑,𝟑 ∗ 𝑿𝟑 + 𝟎,𝟔 ∗ 𝑿𝟒 + 𝟏 ∗ 𝑿𝟓 
The z-score subsequently describes how close a firm’s financial position is to 
those companies in the sample that went bankrupt (Ibid). 
When Altman tested his model on a new sample of firms the model correctly 
pointed out 95 percent of the firms that had gone bankrupt (Ibid). Every ratio 
in the model is multiplied with a constant that represents each ratio’s relative 
contribution as concluded in Altman’s study. In recent years studies have 
been made to investigate how well Altman’s z-score has retained its accuracy 
over time. One study by Heine (2000) tests Altman’s z-score over different 
time periods up to the year of 2000. He use samples of 86, 110 and 120 U.S. 
industrial firms respectively between the years 1969-1975, 1976-1995 and 
1997-1999 and concludes that Altman’s z-score still correctly identifies 82 to 
94 percent of firms gone bankrupt. Some criticism concerning Altman’s z-
score is brought forward by Kyd (2008) where he points out that the input 
data is unadjusted accounting data. Furthermore, the first study made by 
Altman (1968) used relatively small firms and today the data used in the 
study is partially over 60 years old (Kyd, 2008). 
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3.7. Default risk from a credit rating agency perspective 
3.7.1. Role and relevance 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) play a central role in modern capital markets. 
There are currently three major global actors providing credit ratings: Fitch, 
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s. CRAs provide opinions of borrowers and 
issuers of fixed-income securities capacity to meet their financial obligations 
(IOSCO, 2008). Two main arguments are generally brought forward 
regarding the advantages of using credit ratings. First, CRAs enable 
economies of scale concerning data collection and analysis. Following the 
Modigliani & Miller (1961) assumption of symmetric information across 
market participants, credit ratings should, according to the International 
Committee of Securities Commissions (2003) improve market efficiency by 
reducing the existence of asymmetric information, a conclusion also reached 
by Thomas & Dale (1991). Economies of scale advantages can also help 
mitigate adverse selection problems between borrowers and issuers, which 
according to Cantor et al. (2007) can be explained by a sharp increase in the 
use of rating based loan or bond covenants. Secondly, CRAs’ monitoring role 
can mitigate principal-agent problems in transactions where it is complicated 
to observe the other party’s behaviour. The relevance of credit ratings can be 
attributed to its widespread use among governments, investment banks, 
suppliers, customers and other investors/stakeholders (IOSCO, 2008). 
 
However, it should be noted that criticism has been raised regarding the 
market dependency and accuracy of credit ratings. Two studies made by the 
Association of Finance Professionals (2002, 2004) examine the timeliness 
and accuracy of credit ratings and was further studied by Cantor et al. (2007), 
which also summarise key concerns regarding the use of credit rating 
guidelines in the US and Europe. The issues raised were: 
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(i) The hardwiring of market and regulatory rules, where credit ratings are 
incorporated into regulations and investment criterions.  
(ii) The problem of split ratings, where several CRA’s disagree on the 
rating category of an issuer, who therefore has to decide on which to use 
as the preferred rating.  
(iii)The trade-off between rating accuracy and rating stability, as 
heterogeneous users of rating guidelines has different requirements. 
CRAs typically issue ratings intended to last more than one business-
cycle, which is insufficient for active investors more concerned with 
short-term fluctuations in credit quality (Altman & Rijken, 2004).  
 
3.7.2. Rating process 
The analytical process and the methodology behind credit ratings are similar 
among the leading CRAs. Cantor & Packer (1994) examined the evolution 
and reliability of credit ratings. They concluded that credit ratings are a 
reliable relative risk measure and that the leading CRAs follow each other 
closely in terms of rating actions. The standard framework for assessing a 
company’s ability to meet its financial obligations consists of two main parts 
and analyses both qualitative as well as quantitative aspects. The first part 
involves a fundamental business risk analysis, which evaluates relevant 
industry and business specific aspects. According to Standard & Poor’s 
(2008), this part includes a substantial amount of subjective judgement and is 
intended to provide a foundation on which to base the next part, a detailed 
financial risk analysis of the company. This is done quantitatively by 
primarily focusing on analysis of financial ratios. The final part involves 
weighting the business risk and financial risk scores to arrive at the final 
credit score or rating. (Ganguin & Bilardello, 2005) 
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3.7.3. Credit rating agencies’ approach to captives 
Rating process 
When rating AMGs, CRAs assign the captive a weight of 5% in the overall 
credit score (Moody's, 2007). The CRAs generally rate a captive and its 
parent company as a single business unit, which derives from the close 
operational and financial ties between the two entities. As a consequence the 
credit rating between the two seldom differ more than one notch on the rating 
scale (Standard & Poor's, 2007) (Fitch, 2006) (Moody's, 2007). There are 
however exceptions. European captives are often protected by legal 
frameworks that restrict parental influence and prevent it from being included 
in a parent bankruptcy (Fitch, 2006). Their regulatory status also means that 
they are monitored more closely by authorities compared to US captives, 
Source: Standard & Poor's (2007) 
Figure 3 Standard & Poor’s rating determination process. 
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placing minimum requirements on risk management practices and internal 
controls. As a result, Standard & Poor’s (2007) generally assign more 
confidence in the risk management of European captives.  
Risk specific to captives 
Business risk  
Captives are according to Moody’s (2007) generally highly exposed to shifts 
in competitive trends and technological changes affecting the parent 
company, which in turn will affect the business risks of the captive. Another 
factor is the captive’s ability to support the business objectives of its parent, 
often measured as a percentage of the parent’s total sales (Standard & Poor's, 
2007).  
Credit risk 
Credit risk is typically regarded as the most important factor when rating a 
captive. The narrow focus of its operations increases consumer and 
geographical concentration, hindering diversification efforts, hence 
increasing credit risk (Fitch, 2006). Standard & Poor’s (2007) highlights the 
importance of monitoring any indications that the captive is loosening credit 
standards in order to boost sales. Typical indicators of such actions are shifts 
in the residual value setting policy and extension of the duration of auto 
loans. 
Liquidity risk 
Captives typically have access to several sources of funding, including bank 
loans, commercial papers, unsecured debt as well as through the 
securitisation markets. The parent often acts as a guarantee in such 
transactions, which is why liquidity risk normally is evaluated on a 
consolidated basis (Moody's, 2006). Both Moody’s (2007) and Standard & 
Poor’s (2007) highlights the danger of a captive becoming too reliant on such 
market-sensitive transactions, where weakening performance of the parent 
will affect how the captive is viewed by the market, thus impairing its 
funding flexibility.  
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Profitability 
Earnings fluctuations of captives do not always move in sync with those of 
its parent. E.g. if sales are dropping for the parent it may try to boost sales 
through incentivised financing at low interest rates, which in turn boost the 
captive’s revenues, delaying the actual effects from weakening market 
conditions (Fitch, 2006).  
Market risk 
Market risk is generally considered a moderate risk factor and primarily 
concerns interest rate risk, which can be mitigated by matching customer 
receivables or offloading the balance sheet through securitisation (Standard 
& Poor's, 2007). However, should the captive’s ability to perform these 
activities somehow be impaired, market risk becomes an important issue. 
This is because market factors have a large impact on the secondary vehicle 
market, which affects turn-in-rates (Fitch, 2006). 
Leverage 
When assessing the risks associated with increased leverage the key factor is 
the financial policy of the parent. Financial policy refers to funds moving 
upstream as well as the parent’s willingness to support captive operations in 
terms of distress. This risk is significant, but can according to Moody’s 
(2006) be difficult to analyse as the level of disclosure, varies greatly 
between different actors.  
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4. Methodology and data collection 
In the fourth chapter of this thesis we present and motivate the methods we 
use in our study. We end the chapter by evaluating the validity and reliability 
of our research approach. 
4.1. Research approach 
This study aims to investigate to what extent an increased dependency on 
auto captives has affected the likelihood of bankruptcy for AMGs. This is 
done through a quantitative approach were we use regression analysis. 
Aspects not covered by the quantitative study are qualitatively examined. 
 
The lack of previous research, specifically investigating the automotive 
industry, prevents us from solely relying on established theoretical 
frameworks to perform our analysis. We therefore use frameworks created by 
CRAs, the markets main authority on assessing default risk (likelihood of 
bankruptcy), and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Findings by 
previous research studying captives, that had access to internal data, are used 
as reference when interpreting results. Hence, this is a deductive study 
(Bryman & Bell, 2003). 
4.2. Data collection 
This study is based on secondary data reported from the companies. No 
primary data was available due to the restrictive disclosure policies in the 
automotive industry, especially regarding captive activities.  
4.2.1. Sample 
The sample of AMGs is selected through the use of the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) index for AMGs retrieved from the Thomson 
Reuters database. Each company is examined to determine if they use 
captives and how their ownership is structured. 
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The regulations for disclosure of financial information differ between 
countries. Thus, some regions are not represented in the study. For example, 
the AMGs in China and India are not included. We ended up with 12 
companies and a total of 66 observations. Despite some shortfall, the sample 
in the study includes from 73 percent to 89 percent of the total automotive 
industry revenue in the years 2004 to 2008.  
 
 Figure 4 The study’s sample of AMGs compared to total industry revenues 
 
Sources: Datamonitor (2008), Thomson Reuters 
 
4.2.2. Excluded observations 
No observations are excluded from the study since the study aims to find how 
the captive affects the AMGs z-score. If negative z-scores are excluded there 
might be survival bias, which will affect the validity of the study. However, 
none of the companies in the sample has defaulted, even though some 
companies have very low or even negative z-score. 
4.2.3. Company specific data 
The AMGs income statement and balance sheet data is retrieved through 
Thomson Datastream, a database for financial information. A challenge in 
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this study is to retrieve financial information regarding the captives. This is 
done through annual reports downloaded from their respective websites.  
4.3. Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis is used to statistically establish any relations between 
collected data. Several decisions concerning models and variables have to be 
made and are discussed in this section. 
4.3.1. Choice of regression model 
When choosing among different regression models, the number of periods in 
time and number of observations are important factors to consider. Because 
of the small size and short time span of the observations, the selection of 
regression models is quite limited. Our data cover both a time-series and a 
cross-sectional aspect; consequently we need a model that covers both these 
factors. One solution is to use a cross-section data set that estimates the 
independent variables effect on the dependent variable at a particular point in 
time. Repeating this procedure for several years gives an indication of how 
the variables’ effect changes over time. An approach to cross-section data 
sets is to use panel data sets, which are able to control individual 
heterogeneity that keeps the estimates from being biased (Baltagi, 2008). 
This is however not an issue in our study, since all our companies are from 
the same industry. Panel data sets may be better at identifying and estimating 
effects that cross-section data sets cannot handle, but when the time span is 
short a panel data set is not preferable (Ibid.). Hence, we use cross-sectional 
regressions for each of the years separately under the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) assumptions. This is carried out in Eviews, a software used for 
regression analysis.  
 
OLS requires that certain assumptions are fulfilled. We therefore conduct 
tests to make sure that no heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, 
multicollinearity or specification errors exist. Moreover, the distribution of 
the residuals is investigated to see if they are normally distributed. No 
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heteroskedasticity is present in our regressions according to the results from 
white’s (1980) test. The Durbin-Watson statistics show no sign of 
autocorrelation and according to our correlation matrixes our regressions are 
free from multicollinearity. However, when looking at the distribution of the 
residuals using the Anderson-Darling test we can see that they are not 
normally distributed. We use the Anderson-Darling test since the more 
commonly used Jarque-Bera test is a large sample test and therefore is not 
appropriate for our study (Gujarati, 2006). According to Brooks (2008), 
exclusion of outliers may be a solution to the distribution problem. Adjusting 
for outliers did however not eliminate the distribution problem. Furthermore, 
since our sample size is very small, an exclusion of only a few observations 
would severely affect the strength of our quantitative model. According to 
Sprent & Smeeton (2001), an alternative way of performing regression 
analysis is using a non-parametric method, which is free from the assumption 
of normally distributed residuals. Non-parameteric regressions are suitable 
when the sample size is small (Sprent & Smeeton, 2001), which corresponds 
well with our data. For that reason we also perform cross-sectional 
regressions for each year using a non-parametric regression. 
4.3.2. Dependent variable 
Altman’s z-score is used as the dependent variable in the regression analysis 
because of its widespread use and absence of unrealistic assumptions 
compared to the Merton (1974) model. It is important to note that the 
resulting values for each company each year in this study is not meant to be 
an absolute measure of bankruptcy probability, but a relative measure of 
development over time. The constant factors in the Altman’s z-score equation 
can be altered to fit certain industries, however the general weights were used 
in this study as the z-score’s only purpose, as mentioned before, is to 
compare among companies and through time. The general Altman z-score 
model is presented below: 
𝑧 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 1,2 × 𝑋1 + 1,4 × 𝑋2 + 3,3 × 𝑋3 + 0,6 × 𝑋4 + 1,0 × 𝑋5 
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4.3.3. Independent variables  
We aim to test to what extent the risk is transferred back to the parent, 
affecting the AMGs probability of default. This is done by using the asset to 
asset ratio, measured as the captive’s total assets in relation to the group’s 
total assets. 
 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
We expect the asset to asset ratio to have a negative influence on the firm’s z-
score, which is consistent with empirical research showing that captives are 
more prone to take on risk than competitors e.g. commercial banks, by being 
less diversified and by employing more lenient credit policies (Carey, Post, & 
Sharpe, 1998). 
 
Lease transactions are, according to Diekmann (2006), exposed to a more 
complex risk structure than other types of vehicle financing e.g. loans. Lease 
to asset ratio is therefore used to test whether the amount of lease contracts in 
relation to the captive’s total assets will increase the AMGs probability of 
default. 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
Considering Moody’s (2007) arguments regarding credit risk and vehicle 
residual values, we expect lease to asset ratio to be negatively correlated to 
probability of default. The equation used in the regression analysis is 
constructed as follows: 
 
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 × 𝛽1 + 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 × 𝛽2 
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Where the z-score is the dependent variable, lease ratio and asset ratio are the 
independent variables and the constant is the intercept. 
 
4.4. Methodological Problems  
It is important to scrutinise the method used in order to evaluate their 
relevance. This is crucial to the contribution the study has to offer. This is 
done by confirming the validity and reliability (Golafshani, 2003). Assessing 
the validity of a study means questioning if the results generated are 
justifiable when compared to what the study was meant to measure (Bryman 
& Bell, 2003). Ryan et al. (2002) separates validity into internal and external 
validity, which we use as a framework for discussing the validity of our 
study. In order to clarify if the study is reliable, the relevance of measures 
used must be assessed. A study that is conducted in the same way multiple 
times and concludes the same answers is to be considered to have a strong 
reliability (Bryman & Bell, 2003).  
4.4.1. Validity 
Internal validity 
A high internal validity is characterised by changes in the dependent variable 
being described by the independent variables to large extent (Ryan, Scapens, 
& Theobold, 2002). 
 
Although our regression analysis identifies a strong connection between our 
independent and dependent variables, we must consider that macroeconomic 
and other industry specific factors also have an influence on our dependent 
variable. The regression method used is well known and commonly used for 
this type of study and does not inflict on our results.  
External validity 
External validity is described as the possibility for the results to be 
generalised to other settings (Ibid). Our sample represents the majority of the 
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automotive industry. In addition we have analysed the captives in general, 
which implies that our study can be generalised to the whole automotive 
industry as well as captive activities in general.   
 
4.4.2. Reliability   
Data used when calculating Altman z-score are retrieved from Datastream 
and Reuters, both deemed to be reliable sources of information. Captive data 
are collected from annual reports, which can be subjected to manipulation. 
However, external reporting from firms in our sample is regulated through 
frameworks such as IFRS and GAAP. Annual reports are also the main 
source of information used by external investors. Accounting data from firms 
are therefore considered to be reliable. Furthermore, the disclosure of 
information varies greatly over time and between captives. It is therefore not 
possible to make adjustments compensating for changes in accounting 
policies e.g. IFRS and GAAP. Following the CRAs methodology regarding 
adjustments is not possible, since they to a certain degree rely on internal 
information (Standard & Poor's, 2008). This will inflict on our reliability, but 
in order to maintain the integrity of our sample, no observations are excluded 
because of accounting policies. 
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5. Empirical findings and analysis 
In the fifth chapter empirical findings from the collected raw data are 
presented. Results from our regression are then analysed based on our 
theoretical framework. 
5.1. Empirical findings 
 
Lease to assets ratio 
To capture the effect of the captive portfolio the captive lease to assets ratio 
is used in the regression analyses. The standard deviation indicates that the 
ratio is quite stable between the companies. The extreme values in this 
variable are represented by Hyundai and Fiat with a mean of 0.094 and 0.095 
respectively and Honda with a mean of 0.443 whilst the mean of the total 
sample is 0.216. 
Captive assets to group assets ratio 
As a measure of size relationship between the captive and the group, captive 
assets to group assets is used. Ford and General Motors have the most 
extreme values, indicating that the American market deviates from the rest of 
the world. This is most likely because the American AMGs have been under 
Table 2 This table summarises the final sample and observations used in the study. 
 
Company years
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
General Motors 0,104 0,097 0,796 0,707 0,511 0,583
Peugeot 0,223 0,213 0,397 0,389 1,442 1,367
Honda 0,406 0,443 0,582 0,572 1,871 1,845
Toyota 0,208 0,212 0,226 0,225 1,607 1,605
Ford 0,151 0,150 0,615 0,608 0,791 0,808
Volkswagen 0,290 0,290 0,315 0,329 1,168 1,168
Fiat 0,095 0,086 0,253 0,28 1,207 1,243
BMW 0,299 0,320 0,608 0,597 1,114 1,139
Daimler 0,177 0,177 0,494 0,494 1,206 1,206
Renault 0,241 0,238 0,401 0,402 0,798 0,779
Nissan 0,302 0,302 0,479 0,479 1,440 1,440
Hyundai 0,094 0,100 0,181 0,169 1,192 1,190
Mean 0,216 0,219 0,446 0,438 1,196 1,198
Median 0,216 0,212 0,440 0,441 1,199 1,198
0,097 0,107 0,185 0,167 0,375 0,355Standard deviation
2005-2008
2002-2008
2007-2008
2002-2007
2006-2007
2002-2005
2002-2008
Lease ratio Asset ratio Altman's Z-score
2002-2008
2002-2008
2002-2008
2003-2008
2002-2008
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particular pressure and therefore been more aggressive in their effort to keep 
demands high through their captives. For the total sample the mean is 0.446 
which we think is surprisingly high. 
 Altman z-score 
Altman’s z-score is used as a measure of credit risk in this study. The mean 
of the sample is 1.196 where especially General Motors stand out with a 
mean of 0.511. The other American AMG in the sample, Ford, also has a 
relatively low z-score of 0.791 which is only beaten by General Motors. It is 
apparent that the current crisis has hit the American market the hardest. 
Omitting the American manufacturers would of course lead to a higher mean 
but not a more correct mean. Our sample represents from 73 to 89 percent of 
the population which means that the observed is most likely the actual.  
 
5.2. Analysis   
Table 3. Results from the non-parametric regression analysis.  
 
In table 3 it can be seen that the estimates of the independent variables 
remain steady in terms of size and of sign through the observed period. The 
number of observations is few, which make the regression results less 
reliable. It is however important to remember that the results should be seen 
*** significant at 1 percent level. **significant at 5 percent level. *significant at 10 percent level. 
Variable 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002
Constant 1,863 1,488 1,018 0,958 1,006 1,041 1,047
p-value 0,014 ** 0,002 *** 0,083 * 0,085 * 0,092 * 0,079 * 0,260
Lease ratio 1,745 1,084 1,147 2,381 3,038 3,075 2,167
t-statistic 0,928 1,013 0,895 1,488 2,011 2,527 1,059
Standard error 1,881 1,070 1,281 1,600 1,510 1,217 2,046
p-value 0,389 0,341 0,400 0,180 0,091 * 0,045 ** 0,338
Asset ratio -2,372 -1,102 0,185 -0,970 -1,054 -1,099 -0,787
t-statistic -4,201 -2,322 0,268 -1,108 -1,178 -1,304 -0,494
Stand error 0,565 0,475 0,690 0,875 0,895 0,843 1,594
p-value 0,006 *** 0,049 ** 0,796 0,304 0,283 0,240 0,642
R2(robust) 0,718 0,441 0,155 0,358 0,549 0,556 0,343
Prob(F-statistic) 0,022 ** 0,098 * 0,556 0,212 0,092 * 0,087 * 0,349
No. Observations 9 11 10 10 9 9 8
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as the observed trend for the whole population. Moreover, our regression 
analysis under the OLS assumptions generates results, which are very close 
to the non-parametric model (see Exhibit C in appendix) indicating that our 
results are reliable. 
 
The fact that the constant is significant for almost every year is interesting. 
This indicates that if the independent variables were zero the average z-score 
of the companies would be higher in the years 2007 and 2008 than the 
calculated average z-score for the sample. This is most likely due to the 
increasing financial difficulties in the automotive industry especially in the 
U.S. However, in the preceding 5 years this would mean that a captive 
contributes to a higher z-score.  
 
The regression analysis shows that the lease ratio, in contrast to what we 
expected, have a positive influence on the group’s z-score suggesting that the 
more of a captive’s assets that consists of leasing assets the higher the z-
score. Significance can be found in the lease ratio in 2 out of 7 years. These 
findings are inconsistent with research made by Sharpe & Nguyen (1995), 
Carey et al. (1998), Diekmann (2006) and Fitch (2006). It can be argued that 
this may be due to the captives’ ability to realise gains from their leasing 
operations, which exceeds the risk they are taking, which is in line with the 
studies made by Knight (1921), Stultz (1996) and Shrand & Unal (1998). We 
have to consider the possibility that our time period does not include any of 
the years when low residual values hit the market such as the year 2001 and 
most likely the years 2009-2010, due to the financial crisis. 
 
The asset ratio variable, used as a proxy for captive size in relation to the 
group as a whole, shows that the more of the auto group’s assets that consists 
of captive assets, the more the z-score declines. The asset ratio shows 
significance in the years 2007 and 2008. The value of the coefficient 
determines that if the asset ratio moves up by one unit the z-score drops by 
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2.4 units in 2008 and approximately 1 the rest of the years except for 2006 
when the coefficient is positive. The economic significance of this is hard to 
evaluate, for most of the years a 10 percentage point rise in the asset ratio 
would mean a 0.1 drop in the z-score, what effects that would give on loan 
costs and investment restraints varies of course between the companies and in 
what state they already are in. 
 
The regression as a whole shows significance in 4 of the 7 years. Our results 
suggest that the risk within auto manufacturers can be explained to a large 
extent by the activities conducted within captives. This is risk that according 
Froot (2003) and Culp (2001), may inflict on finance and investment 
activities as well as the market value of the parent company. A failure in risk 
management is considered by Culp (2001) as an effect of lack in 
diversification of non-core risk. This would then imply that the captives do 
not succeed in managing the risk that they obtain. 
 
Furthermore, since Moody’s (2007) only assign captive activities a 5 percent 
weight of AMGs total credit rating, our results are intriguing. Our study 
cannot prove the rating agencies wrong, but our regression analysis suggests 
that the captives have a larger influence on the credit rating than rating 
agencies assume. This argument also finds some support in criticism brought 
forward by Cantor et al. (2007) and Altman & Rijken (2004) against the 
accuracy of CRAs.  
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6. Conclusion 
 The sixth chapter will serve two purposes. First, we conclude our analysis 
from the previous chapter. Secondly, a discussion will be held regarding 
important qualitative aspects not explicitly covered by the analysis. We end 
the chapter with suggestions for future research.  
 
6.1. Conclusion 
This thesis set out with the aim of answering the question, to what extent an 
increased dependency on auto captives has affected the likelihood of 
bankruptcy for AMGs.  
 
Our study quantitatively shows that captives are not successful in managing 
their risk. The asset ratio has a negative effect on average approximately 1 
unit on the AMGs z-score over the 7 year period. This is most likely due to 
lack of diversification in the captives operations. The asset ratio is however 
only statistically significant in 2 years.  
 
Leasing on the other hand has an average positive effect of 2 on the AMGs z-
score. This supports Schmit’s (2003) study which concludes that leasing is a 
relatively low risk activity. Support can be found in the risk management 
theories regarding comparative advantages by Stultz (1996) and Culp (2002).  
 
6.2. Discussion 
Looking at the profit distribution along the vehicle value chain (Table 1), 
auto financing does indeed seem like an attractive opportunity for AMGs to 
widen stressed profit margins. This is in line with theory, which suggests that 
automotive finance can, if properly managed, be a relatively low-risk activity 
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due to the collateral offered by the vehicle itself (Diekmann, 2006). However, 
as incentive levels increase, the situation changes and auto groups are 
running the risk of undermining their business model (Fitch, 2008), while at 
the same time increasing the exposure towards residual value risk (Fahey, 
2003). 
 
As mentioned, the regression result for the asset ratio is consistent with our 
initial belief. By analysing our results, using the frameworks established by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) and CRAs, we find 
additional signs of possible flaws in the risk management practices of 
captives. 
 
Standard & Poor’s (2008) indicated that a captive’s association to its parent 
company hinders it from being fully diversified, which according to BIS 
(2000) is one of the main contributors to credit risk. However, it should be 
noted that captives may hold advantage over e.g. commercial banks in terms 
of superior knowledge and experience from the automotive industry 
following the argument by Sharpe & Nguyen (1998).  
 
Another factor hindering sound credit risk management practices is the 
existence of subjective decision-making by management. A possible source 
of conflict of interests in AMGs was first identified by Banner (1958) and 
more thoroughly discussed by Hener (2005) who highlighted the importance 
of management’s ability to balance revenue growth against risk concerns. 
Our quantitative study was not able to show that the credit decision in auto 
captives has been corrupted by sales considerations. However, referring to 
the losses incurred due to aggressive leasing policies during the late 1990s, 
when sales considerations clearly took precedence over risk monitoring 
(Fahey, 2003), we find reason to believe that auto financing activities 
pursued during market downturns may expose them to more residual value 
risk. Especially since any potential difference between vehicles values in the 
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secondary market and estimated residual values only become evident in case 
of default or at lease termination.  
 
This corresponds well to another source of looming credit problems 
identified by BIS (2000), which is an insufficient adherence to business cycle 
effects on risk exposure. Evidence supporting this argument can be found 
from the above mentioned episode. There are also a number of parallels to 
the current development in the automotive industry, referring to the 
substantial build up of production capacity prior to a downward shift in 
demand (CSM Worldwide, 2009) and the failure to anticipate the shift toward 
more environmentally friendly vehicles (KPMG, 2009). 
 
The significance of having sound credit risk management practices is further 
highlighted by the CRAs, who may, if they deem the effects to be long-term, 
penalize an AMG with a lower credit rating. This can have severe economic 
implications for the AMGs, since a lower credit rating is viewed by the 
market as an indication of deteriorating performance, which in turn may 
impair its financial flexibility (Thomas & Dale, 1991). 
 
In contrast to what we believed prior to the study, the lease ratio was 
positively correlated with the z-score which we think might be because of the 
parent’s option to use incentivised leasing through the captive when sales are 
dropping, which is consistent with the increasing level of sales incentives 
(see Figure 5 in appendix). However, this argument only holds as long as 
residual values remain unaffected. Once residual values starts to decline the 
captives’ risk exposure increases. Losses on the other hand might not be 
realised for a number of years since the average lease contract is between 36 
to 48 months. Consequently, we find reason to believe that during periods 
with significant drops in residual values, the lease ratio might be negatively 
correlated with the z-score. Unfortunately our time period does not include 
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such periods e.g. 1996 to 2000 when the residual values declined sharply and 
the undermining of the AMGs own business model was more apparent. 
 
Captives can be seen as a necessary source of competitiveness considering 
the dire condition of the automotive industry. Auto finance is in itself not a 
particularly risky activity. However, if sales incentives are used without 
taking proper care and consideration, captives can quickly become a 
significant source of risk for automotive manufacturing groups.  
 
6.3. Future research 
AMGs have deeply rooted ties with modern society, its importance certified 
by the current governmental efforts to keep them from bankruptcy. Future 
research regarding the use of captives, credit risk management and especially 
the automotive industry is therefore of great importance.  
 
Although we have been able to statistically establish the relationship between 
auto captives and their effect on the risk structure of the AMG we have, as 
often with economic and statistical research, been restricted by data 
shortcomings. Additional research would ideally be performed with access to 
more detailed information such as contract specific residual values and 
industry default rates, which would enable a more accurate estimation of 
risks and loss rates. To fully capture the impact that recent leasing and 
financing activities will have upon maturity, it would be interesting to extend 
this study in 3 to 4 years time. Since little academic research has been 
conducted about credit risk management in financial captives the possibilities 
for new discoveries should be vast. 
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8. Appendix 
8.1. Exhibit A 
  
Source: Adesa analytical services (2008) 
Figure 5 Global incentives per new vehicles sold. 
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8.2. Exhibit B 
 
 
 
  
Source: Adesa analytical services (2008) 
Figure 6 Global price difference between used and new vehicles 
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8.3. Exhibit C 
 
Table 4 Results from the OLS regression analysis. 
 Variable 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002
Constant 1,902 1,213 0,848 0,942 1,075 1,115 1,096
p-value 0,020 ** 0,022 ** 0,089 * 0,026 ** 0,012 ** 0,021 ** 0,039 **
Lease ratio 1,827 1,525 1,238 2,403 2,994 2,601 2,154
t-statistic 0,867 1,136 1,083 2,173 3,260 2,673 2,217
Standard error 2,108 1,342 1,143 1,106 0,918 0,973 0,971
p-value 0,419 0,289 0,315 0,066 * 0,017 ** 0,037 ** 0,077 *
Asset ratio -2,388 -0,755 0,202 -0,860 -1,114 -1,077 -0,795
t-statistic -3,775 -1,268 0,329 -1,421 -2,048 -1,597 -1,051
Stand error 0,633 0,595 0,615 0,605 0,544 0,674 0,757
p-value 0,009 *** 0,241 0,752 0,198 0,087 * 0,161 0,341
R2 0,728 0,262 0,152 0,455 0,686 0,600 0,510
R2 adjusted 0,638 0,078 -0,090 0,300 0,582 0,467 0,313
Prob(F-statistic) 0,020 ** 0,297 0,561 0,119 0,031 ** 0,064 * 0,168
No. Observations 9 11 10 10 9 9 8
*** significant at 1 percent level. **significant at 5 percent level. *significant at 10 percent level. 
